Abstract-Crowdsourcing has become an efficient paradigm for performing large scale tasks. Truth discovery and incentive mechanism are fundamentally important for the crowdsourcing system. Many truth discovery methods and incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing have been proposed. However, most of them cannot be applied to dealing with the crowdsourcing with copiers. To address the issue, we formulate the problem of maximizing the social welfare such that all tasks can be completed with the least confidence for truth discovery. We design an incentive mechanism consisting of truth discovery stage and reverse auction stage. In truth discovery stage, we estimate the truth for each task based on both the dependence and accuracy of workers. In reverse auction stage, we design a greedy algorithm to select the winners and determine the payment. Through both rigorous theoretical analysis and extensive simulations, we demonstrate that the proposed mechanisms achieve computational efficiency, individual rationality, truthfulness, and guaranteed approximation. Moreover, our truth discovery method shows prominent advantage in terms of precision when there are copiers in the crowdsourcing systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing is a distributed problem-solving model, in which a crowd of undefined size is engaged to solve the complex problems through an open platform. Wikipedia [1], Zhihu [2], Freebase [3] , and other knowledge repositories were created by workers, who contributed knowledge on a wide variety of topics. In recent years, crowdsourcing has been widely used in many fields, including video analysis [4] , knowledge discovery [5] , and Smart Citizen [6] , conducting human-robot interaction studies [7] . With the rapid proliferation of smartphones integrated with a variety of embedded sensors, mobile crowdsourcing has become an efficient approach to data acquisition in large-scale sensing applications, such as photo selection [8] , public bike trip selection [9] , and indoor positioning systems [10] .
Many crowdsourcing applications require integrating data from multiple workers, each of which provides a set of values as "facts". However, "facts and truth really don't have much to do with each other" [11] . Different workers may provide conflicting values, some being true while some being false. To provide data with high accuracy to the requesters, it is critical for the truth discovery systems to resolve conflicts and discover true values.
The crowdsourcer aggregates and extracts crowdsourced information in order to discover the truth, where the accuracy of crowdsourcing data is fundamentally important. In crowdsourcing, the accuracy of data can be largely affected by the expertise and willingness of individual workers [12, 13] . Particularly, the workers with different spatial-temporal contexts and personal effort levels usually submit data with different accuracy. Furthermore, the rational workers tend to strategically minimize their efforts when performing the tasks, and thus may degrade the accuracy of data.
Typically, we often expect the true value provided by more workers than any particular false one, so we can apply voting [14] and take the value provided by the majority of the workers as the truth. The main drawback of this approach is that they treat the reliability of each worker equally. Unfortunately, the behavior of copying between workers is common in practice [15] , especially when the crowdsourcing tasks are in the form of questionnaire.
In a variety of domains, there are a huge number of workers who provide information, and repetition exists in a large part (1) Since we consider the workers are selfish and rational individuals, each worker can behave strategically by submitting a dishonest bid price to maximize its utility.
The utility of the platform is:
where ( ) V S is the value of the platform obtained if all of the tasks can be completed by the workers in S with accuracy no less than the accuracy requirement.
We define the social welfare as the total utility of the platform and all workers:
We consider an incentive mechanism The objective of our incentive mechanism is maximizing the social welfare such that each task in T can be completed with accuracy no less than the accuracy requirement.
Note that the problem of maximizing the social welfare is equivalent to the problem of minimizing the social cost (total cost of winners) since the value of ( ) V S is constant under the accuracy constraint. We refer to this problem as the Social Optimization Accuracy Coverage (SOAC) problem, which can be formulated as follows:
Objective: Minimize
Subject to:
where i
x is the binary variable for each worker ∈ i W . Let
The constraint (5) represents the accuracy coverage for each task, which ensures that the total accuracy of all the winners for this task is no less than the accuracy requirement.
B. Dependence Model of Workers
We define the dependence of workers in Definition 1.
Definition 1. (Dependence of workers) We say that there exists a dependence between any two workers i and i if they derive the same part of their data directly from the other worker (can be one of i and i ).
An independent worker provides all values independently. It may provide some erroneous values because of incorrect knowledge of the real world, mis-spelling, etc. We use
W W ⊥ to represent that workers i and i are independent.
A copier copies a part (or all) of data from other workers (independent workers or copiers). Let r be the probability that a value provided by a copier is copied. The copier can copy from multiple workers by union, intersection, etc. In addition, a copier may revise some of the copied values or add additional values. Such revised and added values are considered as independent contributions of the copier. For any two workers i and i , we denote i depending on i by ' → i i , and i depending on i by ' → i i, respectively.
To make the computation tractable, we assume that the dependence of workers satisfies the following properties:
Independent copying: The dependence of any pair of workers is independent of the dependence of any other pair of workers.
No loop dependence:
The dependence relationship between workers is non-transitive. Uniform false-value distribution: For each task, there are multiple false values, and an independent worker has the same probability of providing each of them (we will remove this assumption in Section IV).
C. Desirable Properties
Our objective is to design an incentive mechanism satisfying the following desirable properties:
Computational efficiency: An incentive mechanism is computationally efficient if the truth estimation , the winner set S , and the payment vector can be computed in polynomial time. Individual Rationality: Each winner will have a nonnegative utility while bidding its true cost, i.e. 0, . ≥ ∀ ∈ i u i S Truthfulness: An incentive mechanism is truthful if reporting the true cost is a weakly dominant strategy for all workers. In other words, no worker can improve its utility by submitting a false cost, no matter what others submit. Social Optimization: The objective is minimizing the social cost. We attempt to find optimal solution or approximation algorithm with low approximation ratio when there is no optimal solution terminated in polynomial time. For the latter, the approximation ratio is the ratio between approximation solution and the optimal solution.
III. TRUTH DISCOVERY
In this section, we present our truth discovery algorithm DATE, which discovers the true values from conflicting information provided by multiple workers. DATE performs the following three steps (the details will be shown in subsection A, B, and C, respectively) illustrated by Fig.2 iteratively until the estimated truth does not change or the number of iteration exceed the maximum number of iterations ϕ . 
A. Dependence Between the Workers
We consider that there are two types of workers: independent workers and copiers. For any pair of workers , ' , ' ∈ ∈ ≠ i W i W i i , we apply Bayesian analysis to compute the probability that i and i are dependent given the observation of data set D. For this purpose, we need to compute the probability of the observed data, conditioned on the dependence or independence of these two workers.
We are interested in three sets of tasks: s T , the set of tasks on which i and i provide the same true value; f T , the set of tasks on which they provide the same false values; d T , the set of tasks on which they provide different values. The true value can be obtained through the voting mechanism on data set D for each task initially. In the following iterations, the true value will be determined based on the estimated truth et.
Intuitively, two independent workers providing the same false value is a rare event; thus, if we fix T , the fewer tasks on which i and i provide different values there are, the more likely they are to be dependent. We compute conditional probability of D based on this idea.
We first consider the situation where the two workers i and i are independent. Since there is only one true value, the probability that i and i provide the same true value for task j t , denoted by
where j i A and ' j i A are the accuracy of i and i for task j t respectively. We set
(0,1) ∈ ε be the default values initially, and iteratively refine them by computing the estimated values in later rounds of DATE.
Based on the assumption of uniform false-value distribution made in subsection II-B, any independent worker has the same probability of providing each false value of task j t . Thus, the probability that any worker i provides one false value for task j t is 1 j i j A num − . Accordingly, the probability that i and i provide the same false value for task j t , denoted by
Then, the probability that i and i provide different values on task j t , denoted by
Thus, the conditional probability of observing D is
We next consider the situation where i and i have the dependence relationship. There are two cases where i and i provide the same value for the task j t . First, with probability r, one copies the value from the other (there assumes i copies from i ) and so the value is true with probability ' . Second, with probability 1 r − , the two workers provide the value independently, and so the probability of being true or false is the same as that in the situation where i and i are independent. Thus, when i copies from i (similar for i copying from i), we have
Finally, the probability that i and i provide the different values on task j t is the probability that i provides a value independently, and the value differs from that provided by i :
We compute ( '| )
where ( ') P i i → is the a priori probability that worker i and i
be the default values for every pair of workers initially, and iteratively refine them by computing the estimated values in later rounds of DATE.
Note that the probability of i and i providing the same true or false value is different with different directions of dependence. By applying the Bayesian rule, we can compute the probabilities of ' ⊥ i i , ' → i i , and ' → i i for any pair of workers i and i .
B. Probability of Providing the Value Independently
We have described how to detect the dependence of any pair of workers. However, it is possible that a copier provides some of the values independently, and it will be inappropriate No to ignore the contribution of these values. Thus, we describe how to obtain the probability that any worker provides the value independently in this subsection.
Note that the probability of dependence calculated by formula (15) is based on the whole data collected. To estimate the truth for each task, we should calculate the probability of providing each possible value independently. Obviously, it would take exponential time to enumerate all possible dependence for each value between all pairs of workers.
To make the calculation scalable, we need a polynomial time algorithm. The basic idea is calculating the probability of providing each possible value v by considering the worker one by one for every task. To minimize such error, we hope that both the probability that worker i depends on the workers in \ ∈ that is associated with the highest dependence probability, and make the worker as the first one in ordered set j v W ; In the later rounds, we select the worker that has the maximal dependence probability on one of the previously selected workers. This process ends when all workers are considered.
Thus the probability that the worker 0 i provides value v of task j t independently is
C. Accuracy and Truth Estimation
We next consider how to compute the accuracy of a worker. A straightforward way is to compute the fraction of true values provided by the worker. However, we do not know which the true values are exactly. We instead compute the accuracy of a worker as the average probability of its values for any task j t T ∈ being true. 
Now we need a way to compute ( ) j P v . Intuitively, the computation should consider both how many workers provide the value and the accuracies of those workers. We apply a Bayesian analysis again.
We start with the case where all workers are independent. Consider a task j t T ∈ , for the observation 
Among the values in j D , there is one and only one true value. Applying the a-priori belief of each value being true is the same, denoted by β . We then have
Applying the Bayesian rule, we have
P D v is true P v is true P v P v is true D P D num A
For the truth discovery, if a worker i copies a value v from other workers, we should ignore i when considering v as the truth. Thus, we adopt ( ) The whole process of DATE is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
IV. TRUTH DISCOVERY FOR GENERAL CASES

A. Discover the Truth with Multiple Presentations
In some scenarios, part of workers may submit certain values in abbreviations, missing or incorrect spelling. These values mean the same thing, but without distinction, they will be treated as different values. , we adjust it by considering the similarities between them as follows:
where
is a parameter controlling the influence of similar values. We then use the adjusted support counts for truth estimation (line 28 of Algorithm 1).
B. Nonuniform false-value distribution
So far, we have estimated the truth with the assumption of uniform false-value distribution made in subsection II-B. However, the false values of a task may not be uniformly distributed. For example, in the minds of most people, the capital of Australia is Sydney, but in fact, Canberra is its capital. The probability of false value of Sydney will be larger than other false values.
We define ( ), Accordingly, we revise formula (8) as
Similarly, we need to revise formula (18) as follows:
V. REVERSE AUCTION DESIGN First, we attempt to find an optimal algorithm for the SOAC problem presented in equation (2) (4). Unfortunately, as the following theorem shows, the SOAC problem is NP-hard.
Theorem 1. The SOAC problem is NP-hard. Proof:
We consider a special case of SOAC problem, where the accuracy requirements for all tasks in T are the same. Let A > . In this way, the problem can be simplified as selecting a subset S W ⊆ with minimum total cost such that the workers in S can perform every task in T. Since each worker can bid for a subset of T with a cost, this special problem is actually an instance of the Weighted Set Cover (WSC) problem. Since the WSC problem is a wellknown NP-hard problem, the SOTD problem is NP-hard. ■
Since the SOAC problem is NP-hard, it is impossible to compute the winner set with minimum social cost in polynomial time unless P=NP. In fact, there is no (1 ) ln − n ε approximate polynomial time algorithm for WSC problem [21] . In addition, we cannot use the off-the-shelf VCG mechanism [22] since the truthfulness of VCG mechanism requires that the social cost is exactly minimized. We design our reverse auction, which follows a greedy approach. Illustrated in Algorithm 2, our reverse auction consists of winner selection phase and payment determination phase.
In the winner selection phase, the workers are sorted according to the effective accuracy unit cost, which is defined as min{ ', } 
where the equality relies on the observation that ' '' j j Θ = Θ for every k≤i, which is due to the fact that ' = S S for every k≤i. This is sufficient to guarantee
Before analyzing the truthfulness of IMC 2 , we first introduce the Myerson's Theorem [23] .
Theorem 2. ([24, Theorem 2.1]) An auction mechanism is truthful if and only if:
• [29] , consisting of a truth discovery mechanism and an incentive mechanism. However, they don't consider the crowdsourcing systems with copiers.
B. Quality-aware Incentive Mechanims in Crowdsourcing
Various quality-aware incentive mechanisms have been proposed for crowdsourcing systems. Jin et al. propose  INCEPTION [16] , a system framework that integrates the incentive, data aggregation, and data perturbation. Wang et al. study the problem of measuring workers' long-term quality, and they propose MELODY [17] . Wen et al. propose an incentive mechanism based on a Quality Driven Auction [18] , where the worker is paid off based on the quality of sensed data instead of working time. Jin et al. design an incentive mechanisms based on reverse combinatorial auctions, and incorporate the Quality of Information (QoI) of workers into the incentive mechanism [19] . However, none of these studies considers the dependence of workers.
Overall, there is no off-the-shelf mechanism in the literature, which considers both dependence and accuracy of workers.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have designed a two-stage incentive mechanism for truth discovery in crowdsourcing with copiers. In truth discovery stage, we calculate the dependence for each pair of workers based on the Bayesian analysis, and estimate the truth for each task based on both the dependence and accuracy of workers. In reverse auction stage, we develop a greedy algorithm to maximize the social welfare such that all tasks can be completed with the least confidence for truth discovery. We have demonstrated that the proposed incentive mechanisms achieve computational efficiency, individual rationality, truthfulness, and guaranteed approximation. Moreover, our truth discovery method shows prominent advantage in terms of precision.
